The issue is that the notebook instances’ security group allows inbound traffic from any source IP address, which means that anyone with the authorized URL can access the notebook instances over the internet. To fix this issue, the data science team should modify the security group to allow traffic only from the CIDR ranges of the VPC, which are the IP addresses assigned to the resources within the VPC. This way, only the VPC interface endpoints and the resources within the VPC can communicate with the notebook instances. The data science team should apply this security group to all of the notebook instances’ VPC interfaces, which are the network interfaces that connect the notebook instances to the VPC.
The other options are not correct because:
Option B: Creating an IAM policy that allows the sagemaker:CreatePresignedNotebookInstanceUrl and sagemaker:DescribeNotebookInstance actions from only the VPC endpoints does not prevent individuals outside the VPC from accessing the notebook instances. These actions are used to generate and retrieve the authorized URL for the notebook instances, but they do not control who can use the URL to access the notebook instances. The URL can still be shared or leaked to unauthorized users, who can then access the notebook instances over the internet.
Option C: Adding a NAT gateway to the VPC and converting the subnets where the notebook instances are hosted to private subnets does not solve the issue either. A NAT gateway is used to enable outbound internet access from a private subnet, but it does not affect inbound internet access. The notebook instances can still be accessed over the internet if their security group allows inbound traffic from any source IP address. Moreover, stopping and starting the notebook instances to reassign only private IP addresses is not necessary, because the notebook instances already have private IP addresses assigned by the VPC interface endpoints.
Option D: Changing the network ACL of the subnet the notebook is hosted in to restrict access to anyone outside the VPC is not a good practice, because network ACLs are stateless and apply to the entire subnet. This means that the data science team would have to specify both the inbound and outbound rules for each IP address range that they want to allow or deny. This can be cumbersome and error-prone, especially if the VPC has multiple subnets and resources. It is better to use security groups, which are stateful and apply to individual resources, to control the access to the notebook instances.
Connect to SageMaker Within your VPC - Amazon SageMaker
Security Groups for Your VPC - Amazon Virtual Private Cloud
VPC Interface Endpoints - Amazon Virtual Private Cloud
