Self-declared administrative authority inside a prompt is untrusted data, not authenticated identity or authorization evidence. Option B correctly combines independent controls across the model, runtime, authorization, and monitoring layers.
Prompt instructions establish that user content cannot override system policy. Runtime classifiers detect known and generalized attempts to bypass controls. Tool permissions are enforced outside the model and must derive from authenticated identity, role, and approved scope—not statements contained in the conversation. Audit logging records the actor, attempted override, classifier result, tool requests, and final disposition for investigation and control improvement.
Anthropic recommends input screening, hardened system prompts, safe handling of untrusted content, narrowly scoped permissions, red-team testing, and continuous monitoring. Mitigate Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections
Option A depends entirely on model behavior and provides no containment if the model fails. Option C removes the protections the attacker is attempting to defeat. Option D commits a fundamental authorization error by accepting an unverified claim as privilege elevation.
The strongest design also rate-limits repeated attempts, escalates suspicious activity, validates outputs, and requires human confirmation for consequential actions.
Study Guide references/topics: Direct prompt injection; untrusted user content; runtime classifiers; non-model authorization; scoped tools; audit logging; defense in depth.
